S.6 Explosion of the gaseous sky of a fixed roof tank
Occurrence condition
The main events likely to cause an increase in internal pressure are:
heating of the gas phase of the tank following an external fire,
accidental pressurization following overfilling, malfunction of the pressure control device,
an explosion inside the vessel following the ignition of a flammable mixture,
a rapid increase in internal pressure due to a runaway reaction, or a mixture of incompatible products
The consequences of a capacity bursting are:
on the one hand the emission of a pressure wave, which results from the sudden expansion of the fluid contained in the capacity at the time of rupture and,
on the other hand the projection of the envelope fragments.
Other phenomena can be generated by the bursting of a capacity such as, for example, the formation of a ball of fire, or a secondary explosion, due to the expulsion of a flammable mixture during the explosion. bursting, or the atmospheric dispersion of toxic substances contained in the container.
S.6 Explosion of the gaseous sky of a fixed roof tank
Occurrence condition
The main events likely to cause an increase in internal pressure are:
heating of the gas phase of the tank following an external fire,
accidental pressurization following overfilling, malfunction of the pressure control device,
an explosion inside the vessel following the ignition of a flammable mixture,
a rapid increase in internal pressure due to a runaway reaction, or a mixture of incompatible products
The consequences of a capacity bursting are:
on the one hand the emission of a pressure wave, which results from the sudden expansion of the fluid contained in the capacity at the time of rupture and,
on the other hand the projection of the envelope fragments.
Other phenomena can be generated by the bursting of a capacity such as, for example, the formation of a ball of fire, or a secondary explosion, due to the expulsion of a flammable mixture during the explosion. bursting, or the atmospheric dispersion of toxic substances contained in the container.
FRONSEC
Strengthening cross-border capacity
for control and detection of CBRN substances
(Chemical - Biological - Radiological - Nuclear)
in North Africa - Sahel - Mauritania
Component 1 of the FRONSEC project makes it possible to build a dialogue between partner countries and European experts on the legal foundations of CBRN risk controls at borders.
Component 1 of the FRONSEC project aims to:
Make an inventory of legal standards (such as conventions) and texts presenting good practices (such as guides) relating to the management of CBRN materials in general;
Collect the national legal or normative texts relating to the management of CBRN risks at the borders in the partner countries and analyze them with regard to the relevant international references;
Produce a similar analysis of European legal and normative frameworks in order to illustrate cases of implementation of international references;
Propose and discuss, based on the analyzes produced, recommendations to partner countries based on the realities on the ground;
Facilitate the establishment of a dialogue between partner countries and international institutions and organizations that offer support in the implementation of standards and good practices strengthening national capacities for CBRN risk management at borders;
Build a distance training offer on the theme of "non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction".
During the implementation of the project, the partner countries and the Component 1 team have:
Listed in a matrix the sources of international standards and best practices relating to the management of CBRN materials in general as well as the status of these references for the project's partner countries;
Constructs analysis matrices for the transposition of international standards and best practices applicable to border management for partner countries as well as, by way of illustration, for Belgium and France;
Listed and discussed the conclusions of these analyses, recommendations and priorities for strengthening the legal frameworks of partner countries;
Initiated a process of dialogue between two partner countries and international institutions or bodies responsible for supporting the full implementation of the standards and good practices identified as priorities by the partner countries themselves through a series of multilateral and bilateral meetings;
Deployed online training on “non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction” for national experts from two partner countries.