S.6 Explosion of the gaseous sky of a fixed roof tank
Occurrence condition
The main events likely to cause an increase in internal pressure are:
heating of the gas phase of the tank following an external fire,
accidental pressurization following overfilling, malfunction of the pressure control device,
an explosion inside the vessel following the ignition of a flammable mixture,
a rapid increase in internal pressure due to a runaway reaction, or a mixture of incompatible products
The consequences of a capacity bursting are:
on the one hand the emission of a pressure wave, which results from the sudden expansion of the fluid contained in the capacity at the time of rupture and,
on the other hand the projection of the envelope fragments.
Other phenomena can be generated by the bursting of a capacity such as, for example, the formation of a ball of fire, or a secondary explosion, due to the expulsion of a flammable mixture during the explosion. bursting, or the atmospheric dispersion of toxic substances contained in the container.
S.6 Explosion of the gaseous sky of a fixed roof tank
Occurrence condition
The main events likely to cause an increase in internal pressure are:
heating of the gas phase of the tank following an external fire,
accidental pressurization following overfilling, malfunction of the pressure control device,
an explosion inside the vessel following the ignition of a flammable mixture,
a rapid increase in internal pressure due to a runaway reaction, or a mixture of incompatible products
The consequences of a capacity bursting are:
on the one hand the emission of a pressure wave, which results from the sudden expansion of the fluid contained in the capacity at the time of rupture and,
on the other hand the projection of the envelope fragments.
Other phenomena can be generated by the bursting of a capacity such as, for example, the formation of a ball of fire, or a secondary explosion, due to the expulsion of a flammable mixture during the explosion. bursting, or the atmospheric dispersion of toxic substances contained in the container.
FRONSEC
Strengthening cross-border capacity
for control and detection of CBRN substances
(Chemical - Biological - Radiological - Nuclear)
in North Africa - Sahel - Mauritania
Global Shield Program (PGS)
Launched in November 2010 and initially planned to last six months, the Global Shield Program has grown to such importance and achieved such results that the WCO has decided to transform it into a long-term undertaking. Even the United Nations has recognized the value of the Global Shield Program and encouraged all countries to participate and support it.
Today, Customs administrations in over 90 countries share information on chemical precursors and other components used in the manufacture of IEDs that have been seized or simply undergone import, transit or export to their national territory. Through training, technical assistance, operational exercises, and real-time information and intelligence sharing, the Global Shield Program enables its participants and their partners to be better equipped to counter the illicit diversion of these products in the supply chain.
The general objectives of the Global Shield Program can be summarized as follows:
Promote cooperation between Customs administrations and law enforcement agencies in the fight against the illicit diversion of components used in the manufacture of IEDs.
Increase global awareness of the growing threat posed by precursor chemicals and other dual-use products that can be used to manufacture IEDs.
Engage with the private sector to establish best practice programs to prevent the illicit diversion of precursor chemicals and other dual-use products used in the manufacture of IEDs.
Train customs officers in the detection or handling of products used in the manufacture of IEDs.
Train trainers around the world to enable them to outsource national or regional training.
Identify and seize illicit shipments of IED components and communicate these seizures to other participants and partner organizations of the Program, through a secure communication platform.
Engage in investigations and other anti-fraud activities regarding illicit shipments (trace-the-source investigations).
Identify and share best practices in combating the illicit diversion and trafficking of IED components.
Monitor and track licit shipments of IED components to identify trends, diversity and extent of licit international trade.
Reference documents - Global Shield Program (PGS) - Conference 2021:
1_Intro_PGS Conference 2021_Executive Summary_EN.pdf
PGS BOOKLET_EN.pdf