S.6 Explosion of the gaseous sky of a fixed roof tank
Occurrence condition
The main events likely to cause an increase in internal pressure are:
heating of the gas phase of the tank following an external fire,
accidental pressurization following overfilling, malfunction of the pressure control device,
an explosion inside the vessel following the ignition of a flammable mixture,
a rapid increase in internal pressure due to a runaway reaction, or a mixture of incompatible products
The consequences of a capacity bursting are:
on the one hand the emission of a pressure wave, which results from the sudden expansion of the fluid contained in the capacity at the time of rupture and,
on the other hand the projection of the envelope fragments.
Other phenomena can be generated by the bursting of a capacity such as, for example, the formation of a ball of fire, or a secondary explosion, due to the expulsion of a flammable mixture during the explosion. bursting, or the atmospheric dispersion of toxic substances contained in the container.
S.6 Explosion of the gaseous sky of a fixed roof tank
Occurrence condition
The main events likely to cause an increase in internal pressure are:
heating of the gas phase of the tank following an external fire,
accidental pressurization following overfilling, malfunction of the pressure control device,
an explosion inside the vessel following the ignition of a flammable mixture,
a rapid increase in internal pressure due to a runaway reaction, or a mixture of incompatible products
The consequences of a capacity bursting are:
on the one hand the emission of a pressure wave, which results from the sudden expansion of the fluid contained in the capacity at the time of rupture and,
on the other hand the projection of the envelope fragments.
Other phenomena can be generated by the bursting of a capacity such as, for example, the formation of a ball of fire, or a secondary explosion, due to the expulsion of a flammable mixture during the explosion. bursting, or the atmospheric dispersion of toxic substances contained in the container.
FRONSEC
Strengthening cross-border capacity
for control and detection of CBRN substances
(Chemical - Biological - Radiological - Nuclear)
in North Africa - Sahel - Mauritania
The FRONSEC project
"Strengthening cross-border capacity for control and detection of CBRN substances in North Africa and Sahel."
While the movement of goods and people is constantly increasing, the risks posed by the CBRN threat are becoming more significant in the Sahelo-Saharan region. The FRONSEC project, launched in October 2016, aims to strengthen the controls and security of actors at the borders of partner countries in the area to mitigate these risks, by improving the cohesion of national services and the consistency of their actions.
At the crossroads of traditional trade routes of various kinds, the Sahel and Sahara regions are a major strategic issue. The porosity of certain borders and the use of goods or raw materials that may represent a CBRN risk can therefore create a risky situation.
The FRONSEC project is implemented by Expertise France in 7 countries: Algeria, Burkina Faso, Mali, Morocco, Mauritania, Niger and Tunisia.
It mainly aims to:
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Make an inventory of national legislation on CBRN risks and identify areas for possible reinforcement in comparison with international texts in the field;
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Rely on the P63 program aimed at providing each country with the protection and detection equipment essential to partner countries to ensure the management of CBRN risks;
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Create a regional dynamic to strengthen border security through the training of security forces (controls of goods and people at borders, internal security and civil security) of partner countries.
National seminars bringing together the various CBRN teams already in place in each country were organized in 2020 and 2021. The project will be punctuated by a regional seminar in Slovakia with sequences for sharing good practices and large-scale exercises during 2022.