S.6 Explosion of the gaseous sky of a fixed roof tank
Occurrence condition
The main events likely to cause an increase in internal pressure are:
heating of the gas phase of the tank following an external fire,
accidental pressurization following overfilling, malfunction of the pressure control device,
an explosion inside the vessel following the ignition of a flammable mixture,
a rapid increase in internal pressure due to a runaway reaction, or a mixture of incompatible products
The consequences of a capacity bursting are:
on the one hand the emission of a pressure wave, which results from the sudden expansion of the fluid contained in the capacity at the time of rupture and,
on the other hand the projection of the envelope fragments.
Other phenomena can be generated by the bursting of a capacity such as, for example, the formation of a ball of fire, or a secondary explosion, due to the expulsion of a flammable mixture during the explosion. bursting, or the atmospheric dispersion of toxic substances contained in the container.
S.6 Explosion of the gaseous sky of a fixed roof tank
Occurrence condition
The main events likely to cause an increase in internal pressure are:
heating of the gas phase of the tank following an external fire,
accidental pressurization following overfilling, malfunction of the pressure control device,
an explosion inside the vessel following the ignition of a flammable mixture,
a rapid increase in internal pressure due to a runaway reaction, or a mixture of incompatible products
The consequences of a capacity bursting are:
on the one hand the emission of a pressure wave, which results from the sudden expansion of the fluid contained in the capacity at the time of rupture and,
on the other hand the projection of the envelope fragments.
Other phenomena can be generated by the bursting of a capacity such as, for example, the formation of a ball of fire, or a secondary explosion, due to the expulsion of a flammable mixture during the explosion. bursting, or the atmospheric dispersion of toxic substances contained in the container.
FRONSEC
Strengthening cross-border capacity
for control and detection of CBRN substances
(Chemical - Biological - Radiological - Nuclear)
in North Africa - Sahel - Mauritania
Legal framework
Component 1:
The standardization, adaptation and transcription, in each country, of legislative texts relating to CBRN substances and border security in accordance with international standards in order to promote regional harmonization.
Finalization of the analyzes of the inventoried texts.
Review with partner countries of the questions raised by the analysis matrix.
Drafting of conclusions to be presented to the countries during a next dedicated visit.
Training Module “WMD non-proliferation”.
CBRN Prevention and Preparedness
Component 2:
Make beneficiaries aware of the dangers, risks and requirements related to CBRN materials and products with the help of regional experts;
Chemical risks and precursors (specific for each country)
Radiological and nuclear risks (specific for each country)
Biological risks
Placarding, labeling and packaging
Component 3:
Training of trainers: Support the development of procedures facilitating the mitigation of CBRN risks at borders:
Develop operational procedures and organize training for border operators for CBRN risk mitigation, as well as exercises based in particular on the equipment provided (P63)
CBRN personal protection
Securing agents, (intermediate) storage and necessary and appropriate infrastructure
Implementation of procedures aimed at limiting the risks of operator exposure to toxic gases when opening containers
Control
Component 4:
Train border actors (training of trainers) with the help of regional experts on CBRN control:
Develop/improve procedures for document verification, identification of false documents and action to be taken upon suspicious shipment, including procedures for visual inspection of shipments of CBRN material
Develop procedures for detecting CBRN substances and taking samples, as well as exercises, based in particular on the equipment provided under Project 63
Organization of exercises to strengthen coordination between customs and the police in the control phase, in the event of illicit traffic (handling, transport, isolation, securing).